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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Because this appeal involves a final decision by the Honorable Glen R. Dawson, 
judge of the Second Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(3) and Rule 4, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
The record in this case will consist of the transcript of the January 14, 2002 
hearing on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, the video trial transcript, March 22, 2002, and 
the sentencing transcript, May 13, 2002 as well as the pleadings, motions, and other 
documents contained in the Record on Appeal. Citations will be as follows: to the 
transcripts, "Trans. 1/14/02 p.," "Trans. 3/22/02 p.," and "Trans. 5/13/02 p.;" and to the 
Record on Appeal, "Rec. p." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
As will be shown below, there was no allegation in this case that the bad checks 
involved in the action were issued by Mr. Hopkins under any circumstances involving 
dishonesty or moral turpitude. Rec. 104-05, 116 Nor did the State attempt to prove that 
he or anyone affiliated with him obtained anything of value in exchange for the checks. 
The only element of mens rea found by the trial court was that Mr. Hopkins knew 
Cornerstone was having trouble with its checking account and that "any given check may 
not be paid by the drawee." Trans. 3/22/02 205, Addendum at 43. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Hopkins was convicted of a third degree felony under both subsections of Utah Criminal 
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Code § 76-6-505 and sentenced to a prison term, which was suspended on conditions of 
probation, one of which was that he pay the two checks that did not clear the Cornerstone 
account. Rec. 145-46. 
These facts, and the conviction and sentence, raise the following issues on appeal: 
1. Was the trial court's finding that Mr. Hopkins knew there was a problem with 
the Cornerstone account such that "any given check may not be paid by the drawee" 
sufficient to meet the requirements of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1)? This issue 
was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 99, 108, 116, 118, 163-165; Trans. 3/22/02 188, 
192, 199. 
2. Did the lower court err by leaving out an essential element of the offense when 
it refused to require any finding that the checks were issued for the purpose of obtaining 
something of value? This issue was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 100-02, 109-10, 
167-71; Trans. 3/22/02 201-02. 
3. If not, is Utah Criminal Code §76-6-505 unconstitutional under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the 
Utah Constitution's proscription against imprisonment for debt? This issue was 
preserved in the trial court at Rec. 100-02, 117, 135-137, 166-67; Trans. 1/14/021-%. 
4. Does Utah Criminal Code §76-6-505(2) violate the Utah Constitution and the 
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution! 
This issue was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 102-104, 108-10, 114-18, 171-74; 
Trans. 1/14/02 5-6. 
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5. Was Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees a defense to prosecution under 
§ 76-6-505? This issue was preserved in the trial court at. Trans. 3/22/02 190-92, 194. 
6. Did the trial court correctly avoid constitutional problems with Utah 
Criminal Code §76-6-505(2) by implementing Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-2-102 and 
103? This issue was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 115, 174-75; Trans. 3/22/02 119. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All of these issues are questions of law and are reviewed on appeal for correctness, 
with no deference given to the trial court's conclusions of law. Peterson Plumbing Supply 
v. Bernson, 797 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The provisions of the United States and Utah Constitutions that Appellant believes 
will be dispositive of the issues presented by this appeal are set out below: 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 14 SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in the cases of 
absconding debtors. 
In addition, Appellant believes that Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) and (2), 
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and § 76-2-102 and 103, and case law construing these statutes, will be determinative. 
Those sections read as follows: 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) & (2) 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, 
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by 
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he 
fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the 
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving the actual notice of the 
check or draft's nonpayment. 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-102 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. 
An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof 
of any culpable mental state. 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-103 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
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conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Similar statutory language is found in Utah Code Annotated § 7-15-1, and recent 
case law interpreting that language will also be determinative. That statute reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated § 7-15-1 
1) As used in this chapter: 
(b) "Issuer" means a person who makes, draws, signs, or issues a check, 
whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of: 
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchandise, property, or 
other thing of value; or 
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent. 
*** 
2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the check if: 
*** 
(ii) the account upon which the check is made or drawn: 
*** 
(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for 
payment in full of the check... 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case raises questions about the interpretation and application of Utah's 
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criminal bad check statute. Does it apply to an issuer who is having financial difficulties, 
who issues checks knowing that one or more of those checks may not clear, but warns his 
employees of the situation then does everything in his power to clear the checks? Does it 
extend to cases that do not involve an element of dishonesty or deceit, that do not involve 
an effort by the issuer to obtain some personal benefit? Is the behavior of beleaguered 
businessmen like Mr. Hopkins really criminal in Utah, and if so, can the Utah statute 
survive constitutional scrutiny? 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The original Information (Rec. 1), the Amended Information (Rec. 17), and the 
Second Amended Information (Rec. 66), charged the Appellant with a second degree 
felony. Before the preliminary hearing, nine checks were involved totaling over $5000. 
Rec. 68, et seq. However, at the preliminary hearing, it was demonstrated that all but two 
of those checks had, in fact, been paid. Trans 3/22/02 4. The case was therefore bound 
over as a third degree felony (Rec. 63) on the two remaining checks to Julie Vanisi (see 
Rec. 145), which totaled $2219.85. Rec. 145. 
Mr. Hopkins moved the District Court to dismiss these charges based upon: (1) the 
lack of mens rea in the case; (2) the fact that no '"obtaining" was involved or even 
alleged, and that there was no contemporaneous exchange in any case (the checks were 
used to pay pre-existing debts); (3) the claim that Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) is 
unconstitutional; and (4) that prosecution of Mr. Hopkins, who was not personally liable 
for the debts of the corporation that issued the check, was improper under § 76-6-505(2). 
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Rec. 97, et seq. The motion was denied {Rec. 123), but the lower court ordered that the 
State had to prove some level of knowledge under Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-2-102 and 
103 in order to obtain a conviction under Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2). Trans. 
3/22/02 199-20. 
The case was set for pre-trial at which Mr. Hopkins waived his right to a jury trial 
(Rec. 125), and the case was tried to the bench. Rec. 128,141-42. At the end of the trial, 
the lower court made the following findings (see Addendum at 42-44): 
(1) Mr. Hopkins "was the person who issued or passed each of these checks, had 
authority to issue or pass them. And as the agent of the corporation did it..." Trans. 
3/22/02 205. 
(2) "The purpose of each of the checks at issue was a purpose set out in 76-505-1 
and 2; that is, paying for wages, salary, labor." Trans. 3/22/02 205. 
(3) "[W]ith regard to subsection 2 [sic], the issue is whether he knew it would not 
be paid by the drawee. And as I review State' Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the bank statements 
that show numerous bounced checks in December, January and February, as I review the 
testimony that - that numerous employees were told that, you know, don't try to cash 
this. Just deposit it. We're confident it will pass. That showed knowledge that there was a 
problem. And I think it's sufficient to show knowledge that any given check may not be 
paid by the drawee." Trans. 3/22/02 205. 
(4) That, "with regard to these two checks, they were refused by the drawee." 
Trans. 3/22/02 205. 
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(5) That "the Defendant's conduct was knowing. It was also extremely reckless 
with regard to the state of the business as testified to during the time at issue, February of 
2001." Trans. 3/22/02 205-206. 
(6) "I find that all of the elements of subsection 1 of 76-6-505 have been shown by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Trans. 3/22/02 206. 
The lower court then went on to findings regarding Subsection 2 of § 76-6-505. In 
that regard it found, in addition to the elements noted above: 
(7) That "with regard to each of these two checks he had received actual notice of 
the check's nonpayment." Trans. 3/22/02 206. 
(8) "[H]aving that notice, he knowingly and recklessly failed to make good for 
payment within the 14 days allowed under the statute." Trans. 3/22/02 206. 
(9) And lastly, "I find all of the elements of subsection 2 have been shown by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Trans. 3/22/02 206. 
Based on these findings, the lower court found that there was "a single violation of 
76-6-505" and entered "a judgment of conviction to a third-degree felony." Trans. 
3/22/02 206. Sentencing was scheduled, and the court hinted that it would be amenable 
to a 402 motion to reduce the judgment of conviction from a third-degree felony to a 
misdemeanor. Trans. 3/22/02 20. The State had no objection as long as the required 
restitution was paid in full. Rec. 133, 141. That motion was brought subsequently, but it 
was denied. Rec. 144. The reason given was that Mr. Hopkins, who was financially 
incapable of making payments on the two checks, was thereby showing a refusal to take 
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responsibility. Trans, 5/13/02 15. Sentencing proceeded. It included an indeterminate 
term in the Utah State Prison, not to exceed five years. This prison term was suspended 
upon conditions of probation, one of which was that Mr. Hopkins pay the two checks as 
restitution. Rec. 144-146. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant/Defendant, Richard Ramsey Hopkins, has no previous criminal 
record. Rec. 136; Trans. 5/13/02 9. He had been a lawyer and was a seasoned 
businessman. Trans. 3/22/02 148-49. In February 2001, he was President of Cornerstone 
Publishing & Distribution, Inc., an LDS publishing company 0'Cornerstone"). Trans. 
3/22/02 19, 154. During that month in particular, Cornerstone experienced severe and 
unpredictable economic difficulties. Trans. 3/22/02 87-88, 135-38, 142-44, 164. These 
started with the failure of Zions Bank to make good on promises to provide needed 
capital in connection with Cornerstone's acquisition of Horizon Publishers in August 
2000. Trans. 3/22/02 6, 128-29. To make up for Zions Bank's actions, Cornerstone 
obtained some Accounts Receivable financing in September 2000 (Trans. 3/22/02 7, 
130), but in February 2001, the unpredictable actions of the Accounts Receivable 
financing company wreaked havoc with Cornerstone's cash flow. Trans. 3/22/02 8, 130, 
132-33. As a result, though deposits were made prior to paydays and Mr. Hopkins fully 
expected to be able to cover the checks issued (Trans. 3/22/02 155-56, 158, 165, 177), 
and although previous bad payroll checks had been immediately covered (Trans. 3/22/02 
14 
25, 73), availability of funds in the account during the month of February 2001 was 
uncertain. Trans. 3/22/02 9. 
Payroll checks were issued on the 10th and 25th, ten days after the end of the 
payroll period. Trans 3/22/02 23-24, 175. In February 2001, two such checks—the 
largest ones (Trans. 3/22/02 167)—were issued to Julie Vanisi along with some seven 
other checks to other employees. Mr. Hopkins told the employees of the company's 
financial problems and that the money to cover these checks may not be available at the 
time they were issued, but that, based on his experience with Cornerstone's cash flow and 
given the company's sales (see Trans. 3/22/02 140) they could expect that them to be 
covered or made good. The employees were told to deposit their checks into their own 
accounts and allow them to clear through the Cornerstone account in the regular course of 
banking business. Trans. 3/22/02 58, 60-62, 165, 167-68. The two checks to Julie Vanisi 
were not deposited in the manner instructed (Trans. 3/22/02 65, 156-57) and they were 
not made good by the time Cornerstone filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in July 2001. Trans. 3/22/02 177-79. 
As President of the corporation, Mr. Hopkins issued the checks or caused them to 
be issued,1 but no evidence was ever presented to suggest that he benefited in any way 
from issuing the checks (Trans. 3/22/02 202), or that benefits he received from 
Cornerstone in any way prevented the checks from clearing or being paid (Trans. 3/22/02 
1 Although, one of the two checks was not actually signed by Mr. Hopkins. Trans. 
5/22/02,54,71, 123, 163. 
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175-76), or that he singled out any employee for mistreatment (Trans. 3/22/02 166-67), or 
that he was trying to cheat anyone. Trans. 5/13/02 4, 10-11. 
Mr. Hopkins offered to pay any fees or costs that might have arisen as the result of 
issuing the bad checks, but that offer was ignored. Trans. 5/13/02 2-3. Instead, the trial 
court's focus was entirely on collecting the two checks {Trans. 5/13/02 12-15), 
irrespective of Mr. Hopkins' destitute financial situation {Trans. 5/13/02 16-17) or his 
inability to make the checks good. Trans 3/22/02 177-79. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 must be strictly construed in favor of a 
defendant. 
2. The elements of the offense stated in Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) are: 
a. Knowing that the check will not be paid at presentment; and 
b. Obtaining something of value must be the purpose of passing the check. 
3. The requirement of "knowing it [the bad check] will not be paid" means the 
defendant must: 
a. Have specific knowledge about a particular check. It is insufficient to 
know that one or two out of a group of checks may not clear. 
b. The specific knowledge must be definite, allowing of no uncertainty. It 
is insufficient to know that a check may not clear. 
4. The knowing and obtaining requirements combine to describe an act of 
dishonesty or moral turpitude. Failure to find moral turpitude in the factual situation, as 
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in this case, decriminalizes the act of passing the bad check. Without moral turpitude as 
demonstrated by both the knowing and obtaining requirements, that act was simply the 
failure to pay a debt, which cannot constitutionally be punished by imprisonment. 
5. The obtaining requirement distinguishes the offense described in Utah 
Criminal Code § 76-6-505 from the mere failure to pay a pre-existing debt, which is not a 
criminal act. It requires that the bad check be the inducement for the exchange and that it 
pass contemporaneously with the goods or services obtained by the issuer. 
6. The language that expresses the obtaining requirement in both subsections of 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 cannot be interpreted, as the trial court did, in the 
alternative. That is, it cannot be interpreted to require that the purpose of the transaction 
is either to obtain something of value, or to pay for services. This is because: 
a. The grammatical construction does not suggest an alternative reading. 
Rather, it suggests that other things of value are meant to include payments for services. 
b. To read the purpose language of the statute in the alternative creates a 
dichotomy that is contrary to fairness and common sense. That is, a person can be 
prosecuted for writing a bad check in payment of a pre-existing debt for services, but he 
cannot be prosecuted for writing the same bad check if it is in payment of a pre-existing 
debt for goods or money. 
c. There is nothing to indicate from the legislative history that a major 
change in the statutory scheme (the elimination of an essential element of the offense) 
was intended by the addition of the language relating to payment for services. 
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d. Construction of the purpose language in the alternative is contrary to 
holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in cases interpreting the identical language in Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-15-1, and similar language in earlier amendments to § 76-6-505. 
7. Because interpreting the purpose language in the alternative creates a 
nonsensical dichotomy, Due Process objections are raised under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
8. Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) is unconstitutional for the following 
reasons: 
a. The fourteen days after notice of dishonor during which the issuer can 
pay a bad check and thereby avoid prosecution for the original act of knowingly writing 
that bad check to obtain something of value turns the statute into one that focuses on 
collecting the debt rather than punishing the offense. Further, it establishes a 
classification on the basis of wealth because offenders who are wealthy enough to cover 
their bad checks are not prosecuted, while offenders who are not wealthy are prosecuted. 
b. In this case, the application of both subsections of Utah Criminal Code § 
76-6-505 was clearly aimed at collecting the debt. Thus, if Mr. Hopkins were sufficiently 
wealthy that he could have paid the checks, he could have avoided prosecution or had his 
sentence reduced. 
c. There is unfairness in holding a corporate representative personally 
liable for a pre-existing corporate debt when it was the corporation that became unable to 
pay the debt within fourteen days through no fault of the representative. 
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9. Disclosure to the payees of the checks that they could expect problems with 
them negates any form of moral turpitude in this case and should have been a complete 
defense to the charge. 
10. The constitutional problems with Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) could 
not be solved, as the trial court did, by imposing an arbitrary mens rea requirement under 
Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-4-102 and 103. In any case, the trial court's finding the Mr. 
Hopkins "knowingly and recklessly" failed to pay the checks with 14 days after he had 
notice of dishonor does not amount to criminal intent of any kind. 
11. Accepting the factual findings of the trial court and applying them to the 
arguments above, the case must be remanded with instructions to dismiss it with 
prejudice for the following reasons: 
a. Mr. Hopkins did not know which, if any, of the checks in question 
would not clear, and only knew that one or more "may not" clear, he did not have 
sufficient knowledge to meet the knowing requirement of Utah Criminal Code § 
76-6-505(1). 
b. Mr. Hopkins was merely paying a pre-existing corporate debt when he 
issued the checks and did not obtain any personal benefit, services, or money at 
all, let alone in a contemporaneous exchange for which the checks were the direct 
inducement. Thus, he did not meet the obtaining requirement of either subsection 
of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505. 
c. Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) is unconstitutional and that defect 
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was not ameliorated by the trial court's use of Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-102-03. 
Indeed, both sections of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 are unconstitutional if 
they are found applicable to the facts in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KNOWING A CHECK "MAY NOT" CLEAR IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER § 76-
6-505(1). 
A. THE COURT MUST STRICTLY CONSTRUE THE STATUTE. 
Obtaining goods or services under false pretenses, such as with a bad check, was 
not a criminal offense under the common law. 264 Am.Jur.2d, False Pretenses. It was 
made an offense by statute in Utah. Many other states have passed similar laws making it 
an offense to obtain goods or services by passing a bad check. Regarding such statutes, 
the court in Mullican v. State, 360 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1962) expressed the basic principle 
of jurisprudence that applies to all of these statutes: 
At common law obtaining money by false representation of a fact was 
not a crime. [Citation.] This being true, many States, including ours,...early 
passed statutes for the purpose of preventing perpetration of flagrant frauds, 
and these statutes have been denominated,...as a false pretense statute [sic]. 
In construing these statutes their construction must be strict and nothing 
which is not within the plain words of the statute will be given meaning 
against a defendant, but there will be a liberal construction in favor of the 
defendant. (360 S.W.2d at 38.) 
Under this rule of statutory construction, the requirements of Utah Criminal Code 
§ 76-6-505(1) and (2) must be liberally construed in favor of Mr. Hopkins. 
B. THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE INCLUDE "KNOWING" AND 
"OBTAINING," WHICH COMBINE TO SHOW DISHONESTY. 
Regarding the elements of the offense, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in 
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State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1986) held as follows: 
The defendant was charged and convicted under § 76-6-505(1). That 
section requires the State to prove that a defendant issued a bad check 
knowing that it would not be paid by the drawee at presentment and that the 
defendant issued the check for the purpose of obtaining something of 
value. See State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). (Emphasis in 
original.) 
As stated by the Supreme Court in State v. Pfannenstiel, 22 Utah 2d 31, 448 P.2dd 
346 (Utah 1968), this statute "offends against dishonest and promiscuous circulation of 
phony paper." The element of dishonesty is demonstrated in the two elements, 
"knowing'" and "obtaining." It is present when one obtains something of value by issuing 
a check knowing that it will not be paid. Both elements are essential to make the 
transaction a crime, an offense involving dishonesty. 
While the 1977 amendment to Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 removed the 
necessity of proving intent to defraud {State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983)), it 
did not change these two elements (knowing and obtaining) nor the basic nature of the 
offense. If these two elements (knowing and obtaining) are not found, the fundamental 
dishonesty that marks the offense is absent, and there can be no conviction under Utah 
law. 
C. SECTION 76-6-505(1) REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE THAT A SPECIFIC 
CHECK WILL NOT CLEAR. 
The statutory language of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) states (emphasis 
added): 
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(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, 
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing // will not be paid by 
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
Strict construction of the bolded phrase reveals two requirements. First, the 
knowledge must relate to a specific check. The word "it" refers back to the subject of the 
sentence, "a check or draft for the payment of..." Thus, to be guilty of this offense, Mr. 
Hopkins would have to have known that the specific checks issued to Julie Vanisi would 
not clear. That is contrary to the evidence and inconsistent with the trial court's findings. 
Mr. Hopkins knew the company was having problems with its account, and warned the 
employees that they might experience problems so they should deposit the checks to their 
own accounts and allow them to clear in the normal course of banking. These facts do 
not imply knowledge that any particular check would not clear. 
The second requirement imposed by this language is that the person issuing the 
check must know it "will not be paid." These words admit of no uncertainty and are in 
the future tense. Thus they require that the issuer must know a) that there are presently 
no funds available to pay the checks, and b) that there will be no deposits made in the 
future to cover the checks. The Utah statute does not include language requiring that a 
check be good either at the time it is issued or at the time it is presented. The language 
"will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee" focuses on 
payment by the drawee, whether immediate or eventual. 
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Thus, if a person believes their company's cash flow will cover a group of checks, 
and that belief is patently reasonable as evidenced by the fact that most of the checks are 
eventually covered, that person does not have the requisite knowledge defined by this 
section of the statute. The most that can be found is exactly what the trial court did find, 
namely that Mr. Hopkins knew that one or more of the checks "may not" be paid. 
The plain words of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) do not make it a crime to 
issue a check ''knowing it may not be paid." The language requires that the check be 
issued "knowing it will not be paid." The words "may not" describe a situation in which 
a person is just trying to pay his debts to the best of his ability. The words "will not" 
describe a situation involving dishonesty. 
D. CONSTRUCTION OF § 76-6-505(1) TO ELIMINATE THE ELEMENT 
OF DISHONESTY WOULD MAKE IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A number of courts have held that a worthless check statute that does not include 
fraudulent intent as an element of the offense may be invalid under a state constitutional 
prohibition against imprisonment for debt such as Utah Constitution, Art. I §16. In 
People v. Vinnola, 494 P.2d 826 (Colo. 1972), the court stated that such a statute "could 
be interpreted as nothing more than a collection statute which authorizes imprisonment 
for debt" (494 P.2d at 831). 
In Burnam v. Commonwealth, 15 SW2d 256 (Kentucky 1929), which has been 
cited frequently by courts considering statutes that do not contain the element of intent to 
defraud, the court decried such statutes, saying, "Bad faith or good faith, guilty intent or 
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innocent purpose, the result is the same." It then noted that the giving of a bad check is 
little different than the passing of an IOU or promissory note,2 because the position of the 
creditor is not changed by reason of nonpayment. The court went on to say, "Can it be 
seriously contended that failure to pay a note by reason of financial inability is a crime? 
The barbarous practice of imprisoning one for a mere debt—the obligation not being the 
result of wrongdoing—is a thing of the past" (15 S.W.2d at 257-258). 
In Collin v. State, 168 SW2d 500 (Texas 1943), the court upheld a bad check 
statute that contained an "intent to defraud" element against constitutional attack, noting 
that it was constitutional because it was not the nonpayment of the debt that was being 
punished but the fraudulent act of giving the check. The same result was reached in 
Locklear v. State, 273 NW2d 334 (Wis. 1979). 
It would appear from these cases that removing the "intent to defraud" language 
from the Utah statute as an element of the offense could put the constitutionality of the 
statute in question, unless strict adherence to the knowledge and obtaining requirements 
is maintained/ 
In Utah, it is issuance of a check "knowing it will not be paid" that constitutes an 
element of the offense, not the mere failure to pay the debt. The difference between the 
2 The Burnum court notes that this was especially true in the case of post-dated checks, 
but the court's statements are not limited in their application to post-dated checks. 
3 Arguably, the knowing and obtaining requirements make the old "intent to defraud" 
language superfluous. Requiring proof of intent to defraud as a separate element of the 
offense placed an unnecessary burden on the prosecution. But elimination of that burden 
did not change the necessity of proving the knowing and obtaining elements. 
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two lies in the certainty of the issuer's knowledge. Thus, the statute describes, not the 
good faith effort of Mr. Hopkins to pay his employees, but the dishonest exchange of a 
check the issuer knows is bad in return for something of value such as services. The court 
in Locklear expressed this point as follows: uThe inherent nature of the offense described 
in sec. 943.24(1) [Wisconsin's bad check statute] is that the defendant intends to defraud 
when he offers a form of legal tender knowing he does not have sufficient funds to satisfy 
the obligation created at the time of the issuance of the check." 
The language of the Utah statute requires knowledge that the check will not be 
paid, i.e., knowledge it will never be paid. That kind of knowledge implies dishonesty, an 
element which was clearly missing from this case. The statute cannot be applied to this 
situation simply because Mr. Hopkins knew he was having financial troubles and warned 
his employees that their checks might not clear despite all his efforts to deposit sufficient 
funds to pay them. 
II. "OBTAINING" IS A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE UNDER 
BOTH SUBSECTIONS OF §76-6-505. 
A. THE "OBTAINING" ELEMENT DISTINGUISHES THE OFFENSE 
DESCRIBED IN § 76-6-505 FROM THE PAYING OF A PRE-EXISTING DEBT. 
The "obtaining" element also distinguishes the crime described in Utah Criminal 
Code § 76-6-505 from the situation where a person pays a pre-existing debt with a bad 
check. In the later situation, the creditor has not changed positions. No new thing of value 
has changed hands. A debt existed before the bad check was issued and it continues to 
exist afterward. The creditor has not been deprived of anything by reason of the offense 
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and is not the victim of a crime. The situation is nothing more than a failed attempt by the 
debtor to pay the creditor. Criminalizing the issuance of a bad check in this situation is 
seen by most courts as a violation of state constitutional provisions against imprisonment 
for failure to pay a debt and a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses 
of the United States Constitution. 
State v. Stout, 95 S.E.2d 639, 59 ALR2d 1154 (W.Va. 1956), explains the basic 
principle. The Court there held that a bad check statute did not make criminal the passing 
of a check in payment of a pre-existing debt. As the court there explains, the bad check 
must be the inducement for the exchange and must pass contemporaneously in 
exchange for the thing of value. The annotation that follows Stout in American Law 
Reports 2d indicates that most states have reached the same result even where "for the 
purpose of obtaining" is not part of their statutory language. 59 ALR2d at 1161. 
Utah cases are consistent with this holding. In Peterson Plumbing Supply v. 
Bernson, 797 P.2d 473 (Utah 1990), the court interpreted the identical language in Utah 
Code § 7-15-1, saying, "No goods were obtained from PPS in exchange for the check; the 
items of value, the plumbing materials, were supplied earlier, on behalf of and at the 
request of Bowers." Accordingly, no liability for the bad corporate check was found. 
Phillips v. State, 136 So. 480 (Ala. 1931) specifically applied a similar Alabama 
statute to the payment of wages. There, a conviction for passing a worthless check in 
payment of past services was held erroneous. The court explained that when a bad check 
is passed in payment for something already received by the person passing the check, it 
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becomes a credit transaction and the necessary element of criminal intent is negated. It 
turns the case into one involving nothing more than the collection of a debt. The 
transaction cannot be upgraded from one involving debt collection to the crime of 
obtaining goods or sendees under false pretenses unless there is a contemporaneous 
exchange, a dishonest act that induces one party to pass the goods or services to the 
person paying with a check he knows is bad. 
This principle was followed meticulously in Hindman v. State, 378 So.2d 663 
(Miss. 1980), where the Court held that, because the recipient of a bad check had already 
provided her services to the defendant before the check was written or delivered, the 
check was not the direct inducement by means of which the services were obtained, and 
the payment was made for a pre-existing debt. 
In the within case, all the payroll checks were issued in payment of services that 
had been performed during a pay period that ended ten days before they were issued. 
Under Utah labor law, the employer (Cornerstone, not Mr. Hopkins) was already 
indebted to the employees for the payment of those services at the time the pay checks 
were issued. The wages for which the bad checks were issued in this case were clearly 
pre-existing debts. Thus, the services in question had already been rendered to the 
corporation. Mr. Hopkins was merely attempting to pay the corporate debt for those 
services. 
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B. THE LANGUAGE OF PURPOSE IN § 76-6-505 SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSTRUED IN THE ALTERNATIVE. 
Both Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) and (2) contain the following language 
(emphasis added): "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, 
wages, salary, labor, or rent." This language expresses a critical element of the offense, 
the purpose for which the bad check must have been issued in order to constitute a crime 
under these sections. The trial court made a finding regarding the purpose for which the 
checks were issued, but in so doing it assumed an interpretation of this language that 
construes it in the alternative. That interpretation allowed the court to bypass the 
"obtaining" element all together in this case. 
The trial court may have been aided in its misinterpretation by the fact that the 
original and amended Informations both misquote the statute by adding a comma after 
the words "or other thing of value." Rec. 1,17. The statutory language does not include 
a comma between the phrase "or other thing of value" and the phrase "or paying for any 
services," etc. That being the case, normal grammatical construction would imply that 
the second phrase is not independent of the first. That is, the words "or paying for any 
services," etc. was not intended to define something separate from a "thing of value," but 
are intended to clarify the scope of the words "or other thing of value." Thus, under this 
statute, other things of value include paying for services, wages, labor, or rent. 
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The interpretation adopted by the trial court was that the second phrase is 
independent and establishes another purpose under the statute, an alternative to the 
purpose of "obtaining...any money, property, or other thing of value." That is, the trial 
court assumed that, in order to constitute an offense under the statute, the issuer's purpose 
had to be either "obtaining...any money, property, or other thing of value," or "paying 
for any services, wages, labor, or rent." 
This interpretation bypasses the "obtaining" element entirely in cases that involve 
a bad check issued in payment of wages, while leaving the requirement intact for cases 
involving a bad check issued for other things of value. This sets up a special category of 
bad checks (those written to pay for wages) as to which the Supreme Court's statement in 
Bartholomew (establishing the elements of the offense) supposedly does not apply. 
There is nothing in the legislative history of the "or paying for any services..." language 
that suggests so significant a change in the statutory scheme. 
Indeed, after the 1965 amendment to this statute added the phrase "or wages for 
labor performed" to the phrase "for the payment of money" a similar effort to interpret 
the two phrases independently was struck down by the Utah Supreme court in the 
Pfannenstiel case, infra. The Supreme Court there stated that "the addition of the word 
'wages' just may have been a word of clarification, - not radical change in substantive 
law." That holding applies with equal force in this instance to prevent the elimination of 
a significant element of the offense. 
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Notably, the trial court's interpretation is also a construction of the statute that is 
less favorable to the defendant, and therefore contravenes the rule of construction first 
above stated. 
Similar language appears in Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(2)(a), which imposes civil 
liability and fines for bad checks. It defines the Issuer as the person to be held liable and 
uses the same language for that definition as is contained in § 76-6-505, namely the 
"obtaining" language. However, in § 7-15-1, the wording of the language in question is 
arranged very differently from the same language in § 76-6-505 {see the respective 
statutes set forth above). In fact, the punctuation in the civil version would appear to 
support the interpretation assumed by the trial court in this case. 
However, notwithstanding the distinct punctuation in § 7-15-1, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1989), construed that language "to require that the signator of a bad check 
personally receive benefits, services, or money transfer...in order to be held liable" (782 
P.2d at 467, emphasis added).4 
Further, the Mountain States court noted: "Where possible, statutes should be 
construed to be mutually consistent" (782 P.2d at 467). This consistency of construction 
4 The omitted language states "or, in the alternative, have actual knowledge that the 
check is drawn on insufficient funds." However, Utah Code Ann.§ 7-15-1 is a civil 
liability statute, and does not include a knowledge, or mens rea, element. Therefore, the 
aspect of the ruling that speaks in the alternative ("obtaining" or "knowing") is not 
applicable to our analysis of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1), which requires both 
elements ("obtaining" and "knowing"). 
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requires that the identical language in Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 receive the same 
interpretation. To rule otherwise offends common sense, for it is a strange crime indeed 
that is not intended to obtain some kind of personal benefit for its perpetrator. Thus, no 
matter how it is expressed grammatically, the issuer of a bad check must "personally 
receive benefits, services, or money transfer" in order to be found criminality liable under 
§ 76-6-505. This result is consistent, as it should be, with the description of the offense 
in Bartholomew. 
C. THE "OBTAINING" ELEMENT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO 
AVOID A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION. 
The holding of Mountain States specifically mentions both goods and services, 
and constitutional objections arise if the "obtaining" language is not applied to both 
goods and services. To hold otherwise creates an unexpected dichotomy between bad 
checks written to pay for goods and bad checks written to pay for services. This is 
contrary to common sense and renders the statute vague and uncertain. The court in State 
v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980), a bad check case discussed more fully below, 
makes this point: 
A statute defining an offense is void on the ground of "vagueness" 
and is violative of due process when the conduct prohibited or permitted is 
expressed in terms so vague that men differ as to its application [Citations.] 
A basic thread in the fabric of our law is the time-honored principle that all 
persons are presumed to know the law. Conversely, no person may be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which that person could not reasonably 
understand to be proscribed. 301 N.W.2d at 110. 
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In the within case, it is difficult to argue that the language of the statute puts 
anyone on notice that they will not be prosecuted if they pay a pre-existing debt for 
goods with a bad check, but they will be prosecuted if they are paying a pre-existing debt 
for service with a bad check. Nevertheless, that is the very situation that prevails in Utah 
according to the trial court. Such an interpretation makes the statute vulnerable to attack 
on due process grounds. 
In Mountain States, the court argued that uOne of the cardinal principles of 
statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the 
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing 
with the subject" (782 P.2d at 466). The court further stated that we may reasonably 
assume the legislature intended a fair result (782 P.2d at 467). However, it is patently 
unfair to prosecute an individual who pays a pre-existing debt for services with a bad 
check, while refraining from the prosecution of an individual who pays a pre-existing 
debt for goods with the same bad check. 
Such unfairness rises to the level of a due process violation, and the Mountain 
States court was concerned about the constitutional arguments raised in that case (782 
P.2d at 467), arguments that exist even more urgently in the within case because it 
involves a criminal prosecution. As the court notes, if a statute can be construed so as to 
avoid constitutional attack, that construction should be adopted (782 P.2d at 467). 
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III. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE % 76-6-505(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. THE FOURTEEN-DAY SAFE HAVEN IN § 76-6-505(2) RENDERS IT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
There is a constitutional problem with subsection (2) as it is currently phrased. In 
State v. Ohnstad, 392 N.W.2d 389 (N.D. 1986), the North Dakota court carefully 
considered the constitutionality of a statute similar to Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-
505(2). The Ohnstad court's odyssey in arriving at its decision in that case involved a 
series of cases that considered various amendments to the North Dakota statute. That 
series of cases presents a body of carefully considered law that is instructive as to the 
constitutionality of statutes like the Utah statute as follows: 
In State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980), the Ohnstad court considered 
a statute that established as a crime the issuance of a check without sufficient funds but 
established as an affirmative defense the payment of the check within 30 days after 
receiving written notice of nonpayment. The court reasoned as follows (301 N.W.2d at 
While it is impossible for the legislature to draw classifications 
equally in all cases, the classification in the criminal statute which affords a 
defense only on the basis of the ability of a defendant to pay the amount of 
the nonsufficient fund check calls for a standard of review greater than the 
rational relationship—"rational basis"—standard...The failure to pay 
[within 30 days after receiving written notice of nonpayment] results in a 
criminal prosecution for commission of a felony whereas a drawer who 
pays the holder of the instrument within thirty days after receiving written 
notice of nonpayment is provided with an affirmative defense.... 
The classification contained in § 6-08-16.2, N.D.C.C, is invalid 
unless it serves an important state interest and the classification based upon 
wealth is substantially related to that interest. [Citation.] While the state 
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interest in preventing the issuance of nonsufficient fund checks is important, 
the classification based upon the ability of a defendant to pay for an 
affirmative defense to criminal prosecution is not substantially related to 
that interest. Thus, the classification based upon wealth constitutes a denial 
of equal protection... and, therefore, § 6-08-16.2, N.D.C.C, is 
constitutionally infirm. 
In other words, if the state establishes that issuing a bad check is a crime, it cannot 
allow the criminal to get off by simply paying the bad check. Otherwise, it is merely a 
criminalized debt collection service, i.e., debtor's prison. If that is the effect of the 
statutory scheme, which it was in Carpenter and it is in the case of Utah Criminal Code § 
76-6-505(2), the statute violates equal protection. 
In State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301 (N.D. 1981), the same court examined the 
next version of North Dakota's bad check statute, focusing on its strict liability nature, 
which, like Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2), does not set out a knowledge or other 
mens rea requirement. The new North Dakota statute was also challenged on the basis 
that it violated a provision of the North Dakota Constitution identical to Utah 
Constitution, Article I, §16. This version of the statute was upheld as constitutional 
because: 
the penalty of imprisonment is not for failure to pay a debt, but for issuing a 
check without sufficient funds...The penalty is not for failure to make 
satisfaction for the check [citation]; nor does the statute provide for 
dismissal of the prosecution upon payment of the check. [Citation.] (312 
N.W.2d at 307). 
The final incarnation of the North Dakota statute was found constitutional in State 
v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1984) because it "makes no classification on the 
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basis of wealth," and ''because it permitted, but did not require, a notice of dishonor to be 
sent." The court also noted that subsequent payment did not constitute an affirmative 
defense in the new statute. 392 N.W.2d at 391. A similar result was found in State v. Wilt, 
371N.W.2dl59(N.D. 1985). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF § 76-6-505 RENDERS IT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Ohnstad, the court overturned the same statute based on the practice of the 
State Attorney's office. In so doing, the court cited the principle that a statute that is 
constitutional on its face may violate equal protection in its application or effect. 
Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 73 L.Ed.2d 948 (1982). 
In the Ohnstad case, the offending practice consisted of "sending a notice of 
dishonor specifying that if the matter has not been settled within 10 days the State's 
Attorney would consider criminal charges." Also, evidence showed that 70 percent of the 
persons whose checks came to the attention of the State's Attorney responded to the 
notices of dishonor and were not prosecuted. Over 95 percent of the persons charged with 
bad check violations were people who received the notice but did not pay the check. 
Further, in most cases they would not have been prosecuted if they had paid the check. 
This practice was found to be indistinguishable from the situation established by the law 
declared unconstitutional in Carpenter. 392 N.W.2d at 391. 
In the within case, such statistics are necessary. The practice described in Ohnstad 
is indistinguishable from the actual statutory language in Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-
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505(2). That language allows those who have money to pass bad checks and obtain 
goods or services then avoid prosecution by covering their checks at a later time (i.e., 
within 14 days of notice of nonpayment), while the poor, who find themselves unable to 
make payment within the time specified, are turned into felons whether they acted in 
good faith or not. Both the rich man and the poor man have issued bad checks, but the 
statute demands a difference in their prosecution based solely on their ability to make the 
checks good within a specified period. 
The fact that payment of the bad check negates the offense (if done within some 
period of time after receiving notice of dishonor or nonpayment) is what makes the 
statute unconstitutional. It is the quintessence of the problem that made the earlier North 
Dakota statutes unconstitutional. Clearly, the crime punished by this subsection of the 
statute is not the writing of a bad check, but the failure to satisfy that check within a 
specified period of time after notice of nonpayment. That amounts to debtor's prison and 
is a violation of equal protection. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF § 76-6-505(1) RAISES 
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS. 
Even in the case of prosecution under Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1), the 
statute is unconstitutional if, as a matter of practice, those who pay their bad checks are 
not prosecuted. In the within case, everything from the judge's rejection of Mr. Hopkins' 
offer to pay restitution in the form of fees or charges incurred as a result of issuing the 
bad checks, to his denial of Mr. Hopkins' motion to reduce the sentence to a 
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misdemeanor because Mr. Hopkins had made no payments on the bad checks (regardless 
of his financial inability to do so), to his sentence requiring full payment of the checks as 
restitution in the case, demonstrates beyond equivocation that the focus of the State's 
prosecution is to collect the debt by threat of imprisonment. The lower court made the 
crime "one for failure to pay." See, State v. Ohnstad, 392 NW2d at 392. It follows that 
subsection (2) is unconstitutional in its language, and the entire section is unconstitutional 
because of its application in this case. 
D. APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY IN A REPRESENTATIVE SETTING 
WORKS UNFAIRNESS, 
Another reason to find a Due Process violation in this particular case is the fact 
that Mr. Hopkins was acting in a representative capacity. The strict liability nature of 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) works great unfairness when the representative of a 
corporate entity issues a check then the corporation becomes unable to cover that check. 
Where the check is (a) issued in a good faith attempt to pay a pre-existing corporate debt; 
(b) the future inability of the corporation to cover the check is not certain; and (c) it 
occurs through no fault of the representative, it is unfair to hold the representative 
personally liable, especially where he receives no personal benefit from issuing the 
check. 
IV. MR. HOPKINS' DISCLOSURE TO THE EMPLOYEES NEGATED 
CRIMINALITY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN A DEFENSE IN THIS CASE. 
It is a basic principal of criminal law that criminal intent or mens rea is a 
necessary element of all statutory crimes involving moral turpitude, even if the statute 
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does not expressly make an intent to defraud an element of the crime. See 21 AmJur2d, 
Criminal Law. § 129. Section 76-6-505 is no exception, as has been noted above. Thus, 
circumstances which negate mens rea should be defenses in a criminal prosecution. 
Disclosure by the issuer of a check to the payee at the time of issuance of the check that 
the issuer lacks sufficient funds with the bank to meet the check usually purges the 
transaction of its criminal character. 32 AmJur2d, False Pretenses, § 73. This principal 
is often applied to prosecutions for the failure of a post-dated check to clear {see e.g., 
State v. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953); and State v. Trogstad, 100 P.2d 
564 (Utah 1940)), but the principal is equally applicable in this case. Mr. Hopkins 
disclosed the potential problems with the checks to his employees. This should have 
been a complete defense to prosecution under the statute. 
V. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE §§ 76-2-102 AND 103 CANNOT BE USED TO CURE 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF UTAH CRIMINAL CODE § 76-6-
505(2). 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) requires a culpable mental state. Utah 
Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) does not. But, as noted in the North Dakota cases cited 
above, there is no constitutional problem with a strict liability statute of this nature. It is 
the 14-day deadline that establishes an unconstitutional classification. Therefore, the use 
of §§ 76-2-102 and 103 to add a mens rea requirement, as the trial court did, merely adds 
insult to injury. In fact, the trial court's effort to legislate an improved statute is 
specifically forbidden by Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-102 itself. Thus, the finding of 
reckless disregard, the level of knowledge arbitrarily set by the trial court, is entirely 
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irrelevant and unnecessary to the judgment of conviction. Moreover, that finding does 
not in any way aid the State in overcoming the constitutional problems associated with 
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2). 
In any case, the trial court did not apply a true mens rea requirement. All it found 
was the Mr. Hopkins knew the checks had been dishonored and that "having that notice, 
he knowingly and recklessly failed to make good for payment within the 14 days allowed 
under the statute." This is not criminal intent by any definition, especially in so far as 
passing a bad check is concerned. This mental state did not occur, if it did at all, until 
long after the checks were passed, when there was nothing Mr. Hopkins could do about 
the problem since the corporation was in bankruptcy and he had no remaining assets from 
which to pay the checks. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding that a knowledge of the fact that one or more issued 
checks "may not" clear is the same as knowing a specific check will not clear, as required 
under § 76-6-505(1), is clear error. The trial court also erred in refusing to find a critical 
element of the offense simply because the bad checks were issued in payment of wages 
rather than goods. There was no obtaining in this case since it involved payments on pre-
existing debts. Further, Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees negates criminal intent 
entirely and is a valid and complete defense. Finally, it appears that § 76-6-505(2) is 
unconstitutional, and that, as it was applied in this case—the focus of prosecution being 
wholly on collection of the debt—the entire statute is unconstitutional under both the 
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Utah and the U.S Constitutions, and the unconstitutional nature of § 76-6-505(2) was not 
ameliorated by the trial court's use of Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-2-102 and 103. 
Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to 
dismiss it with prejudice. 
r 
DATED this 5J_ day of October 2002. 
Richard R. Hopkins 
Appellant/Defendant 
in Propria Persona 
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204 
AND THERE ARE TIMES IN OUR LIFE THAT COMING UP WITH $2,000 CAN 
BE QUITE DIFFICULT, BUT IT'S NOT IMPOSSIBLE. IT'S NOT 
IMPOSSIBLE IN OUR SOCIETY, IN OUR CULTURE FOR AN EDUCATED MAN 
WITH DILIGENT EFFORT TO LOCATE, BORROW — I'M NOT GOING TO 
SUGGEST STEALING — BUT BORROW OR OTHERWISE LOCATING FUNDS 
LEGITIMATELY. AND IT WAS RECKLESS FOR HIM TO ALLOW THE CHECKS 
AND THEN NOT BE MORE DILIGENT TO GET THEM COVERED. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. THOUGH I'VE LISTENED 
CAREFULLY TO THE EVIDENCE AS IT CAME IN. I'VE LISTENED 
CAREFULLY TO YOUR ARGUMENTS AS YOU PRESENTED THEM. I'M AWARE 
OF THE STATUTE AND I'M AWARE OF THE COURT'S REVIEWING PRIOR 
TO TODAY'S TRIAL. 
I THINK I'M PROBABLY IN AS GOOD A POSITION RIGHT NOW AS I 
WILL BE AT ANY TIME TO MAKE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING 
THE EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED. IT'S FRESH IN MY MIND NOW 
AS IT WILL EVER BE. 
MY BEST VIEW OF THIS, FOLKS, IS THAT, FIRST OF ALL, I 
THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY AS COUNSEL'S ARGUED THAT MR. HOPKINS 
IS A VERY INTELLIGENT MAN, VERY HIGHLY EDUCATED, IS A VERY 
EXPERIENCED BUSINESSMAN BASED ON HIS TESTIMONY. AND MY BEST 
VIEW IS THAT AS PRESIDENT OF THIS CORPORATION HE WAS 
RESPONSIBLE — THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ISSUANCE OR 
PASSING OF THESE PAYROLL CHECKS. 
NOW, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND UNDER THE LAW 
THAT'S SET OUT IN 76-2-205, I FIND THAT IN THAT CAPACITY HE 
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WAS THE PERSON WHO ISSUED OR PASSED EACH OF THESE CHECKS, HAD 
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE OR PASS THEM. AND AS THE AGENT OF THE 
CORPORATION DID IT, EVEN WITH REGARD TO THAT CHECK THAT MAY BE 
HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW'S SIGNATURE AS HE'S TESTIFIED, THAT 
ULTIMATELY IT WAS HE WHO ISSUED AND PASSED THAT CHECK FOR 
PAYROLL THAT WAS HONESTLY DUE AND OWING IN AN AMOUNT THAT WAS 
THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS AFTER. 
THE PURPOSE OF EACH OF THE CHECKS AT ISSUE WAS A PURPOSE 
SET OUT IN 76-505-1 AND 2; THAT IS, PAYING FOR WAGES, SALARY, 
LABOR. AND WITH REGARD TO SUBSECTION 2, THE ISSUE IS WHETHER 
HE KNEW IT WOULD NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE. AND AS I REVIEW 
STATE'S EXHIBITS 1, 2, AND 3, THE BANK STATEMENTS THAT SHOW 
NUMEROUS BOUNCED CHECKS IN DECEMBER, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, AS 
I REVIEW THE TESTIMONY THAT ~ THAT NUMEROUS EMPLOYEES WERE 
TOLD THAT, YOU KNOW, DON'T TRY TO CASH THIS. JUST DEPOSIT IT. 
WE'RE CONFIDENT IT WILL PASS. THAT SHOWED KNOWLEDGE THAT 
THERE WAS A PROBLEM. AND I THINK IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
KNOWLEDGE THAT ANY GIVEN CHECK MAY NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE. 
THERE SEEMED TO BE A SUGGESTION THAT THE CRIME WAS 
COMMITTED BY THE EMPLOYEES FOR NOT FOLLOWING STRICTLY THE 
DIRECTIONS OF DEPOSITING THEM RATHER THAN TRYING TO CASH THEM 
OR WAITING SOME TIME BEFORE THEY DEPOSIT THEM. AND I GUESS I 
JUST DON'T SEE IT THAT WAY. 
IT'S CLEAR WITH REGARD TO THESE TWO CHECKS, THEY WERE 
REFUSED BY THE DRAWEE AND THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS KNOWING. 
ZUb 
IT WAS ALSO EXTREMELY RECKLESS WITH REGARD TO THE STATE OF THE 
BUSINESS AS TESTIFIED TO DURING THE TIME AT ISSUE, FEBRUARY OF 
2001. AND I FIND THAT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 1 OF 
76-6-505 HAVE BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
WITH REGARD TO 2, WE'VE ALREADY COVERED SOME OF THE 
ELEMENTS, AND WE DROP DOWN TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER HE LATER 
RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN MADE GOOD. 
AND I DO FIND THAT WITH REGARD TO EACH OF THESE TWO CHECKS HE 
HAD RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE CHECK'S NONPAYMENT. WITH 
REGARD TO THE EARLIER CHECK, NOTICE CAME FROM A LETTER BY 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION. WITH REGARD TO BOTH OF THE 
CHECKS, THERE WAS NOTICE PROVIDED BY THE EMPLOYEE, MISS 
VANISI, THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN PAID. AND I ACCEPT YOUR 
TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO THAT, AND MAKE IT FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT. 
HAVING THAT NOTICE, HE KNOWINGLY AND RECKLESSLY FAILED TO 
MAKE GOOD FOR PAYMENT WITHIN THE 14 DAYS ALLOWED UNDER THE 
STATUTE. AND I FIND ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 2 HAVE 
BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
BASED ON THOSE FINDINGS AND IN LIGHT OF THE AMENDED 
INFORMATION THAT IS FILED BY THE STATE, I DO FIND THAT THERE 
HAS BEEN A SINGLE VIOLATION OF 7 6-6-505 AND WILL ENTER A 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION TO A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY BASED ON THAT. 
I WILL SET SENTENCING IN THE MATTER — LET'S SEE. 
MR. DRAKE, HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CALENDAR WITH YOU? 
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